Incentivos à corrupção e à inação no serviço público: Uma análise de desenho de mecanismos

Maurício Soares Bugarin and Fernando B. Meneguin

No 15/2013, Economics and Politics Working Paper Series from Economics and Politics Research Group (EPRG), University of Brasília

Abstract: The present paper analyzes the institutional incentives public managers face in Brazil. A decision-theoretic model suggests that the constitutional principle of "Legality" induces tenured civil servants to adopt a non-innovative, bureaucratic management. On the other hand, temporary appointed managers tend to be more active, which could either generate higher social returns, in the case of socially inclined managers, or lower social return, in the case of managers involved in corrupt activities. A panel data econometric analysis from 2002 to 2011 suggests that Ministries with higher percentages of temporary appointed managers tend to have higher corruption levels. A mechanism design modeling shows how institutions could be adjusted in order to stimulate social-benefic innovative management while curbing corrupt practices in the country.

Keywords: Gestão pública; Princípio da Legalidade; Gestão inovadora; Corrupção; Public management; the Legality Principle; Innovative management; Corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-06-26
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gvn:eprgwp:152013

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23602701

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