Modelos Microeconômicos de Análise da Litigância

Fábio Avila de Castro

No 37/2014, Economics and Politics Working Paper Series from Economics and Politics Research Group (EPRG), University of Brasília

Abstract: The goal of this work is to present a qualitative analysis of the Brazilian rules and institutes of civil and tax laws, using two microeconomic models of dispute resolution: the optimism model or differing perceptions model and the asymmetric information model.

Keywords: litigância; modelo do otimismo; jogos de barganha; assimetria de informação; litigation; optimism model; bargain games and asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 K10 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-08-20
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gvn:eprgwp:372014

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23601850

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