Análise do impacto da alteração normativa na aposentadoria por invalidez no Brasil
Helvio Antonio Pereira Marinho,
Moisés Resende Filho and
Vander Mendes Lucas
No 64/2016, Economics and Politics Working Paper Series from Economics and Politics Research Group (EPRG), University of Brasília
Abstract:
We investigate the response of federal civil servants to more stringent rules for disability retirement introduced by the Constitutional Amendment 41/2003 (EC 41/2003). First, we look for changes in the health conditions of Brazilians so to speculate on their effects on the use of disability benefit in Brazil. Then, we use those results in setting the control variables of econometric models we use to compare the behavior of civil servants (treatment group) and private sector workers (control group) in terms of the number and incidence of retirement disability. Based on difference-in-differences estimates, we conclude that civil servants reacted to the incentive created with the new rules by preventing disability retirements, thus mitigating the moral hazard problem of social security.
Keywords: previdência Social; aposentadoria por invalidez; diferenças em diferenças; incentivos; risco moral; social security; disability retirement; difference-in-differences; incentives; moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 D71 H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-04-06
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gvn:eprgwp:642016
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23594279
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