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A reforma política sob o ponto de vista da análise econômica do direito

Pedro Fernando Nery and Fernando B. Meneguin

No 69/2017, Economics and Politics Working Paper Series from Economics and Politics Research Group (EPRG), University of Brasília

Abstract: The text aims to analyze the consequences and behaviors that emerge from electoral legislation, focusing on the changes that are being raised in the context of political reform to try to reduce corruption and unethical practices in general. Three measures are further examined: public campaign funding, prohibition of re-election and district vote. To do so, we will use the instruments of Economic Analysis of Law, especially economic theory of crime, rational choice theory, game theory and the concept of adverse selection. The conclusion reached is that the effects of the reform will be minimized or mitigated because society keeps not having mechanisms to discourage bad practices. If the changes do not involve stronger institutions, there is a risk of changing the rules of the game without changing the players' behavior.

Keywords: Reforma política; Análise Econômica do Direito; Financiamento público de campanha; Reeleição; Voto distrital; Political reform; Law and Economics; Public campaign funding; Re-election and district vote (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-04-10
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gvn:eprgwp:692017

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23594347

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