Informed Principal and Countervailing Incentives

Pierre Fleckinger ()
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Pierre Fleckinger: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: It has been shown by Maskin and Tirole (1990, proposition 11) that with quasi-linear preferences and private values, an informed principal neither gains nor loses if her private information is revealed before contracting takes place. The note shows that this result may not hold when the agent faces countervailing incentives.

Keywords: Informed Principal; Countervailing Incentives; Risk Neutrality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-02
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00607075v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published in Economics Letters, 2007, 94 (2), pp.240-244. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2006.06.039⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00607075

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.06.039

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