Repeated interactions and endogenous contractual incompleteness

Jean Beuve () and Claudine Desrieux ()
Additional contact information
Jean Beuve: IAE Paris - Sorbonne Business School, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Claudine Desrieux: CRED - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit - UP2 - Université Panthéon-Assas

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: This paper empirically investigates the interaction between repeated transactions and endogenous contractual incompleteness. We design an indefinitely repeated games experiment between identifiable players. In this experiment, the probability of continuation and the level of shared information vary over the treatments. The level of contractual completeness is decided by participants at each period. Our results show that past interactions are a stronger determinant of the level of investment in contractual completeness than the perspective of future business.

Keywords: Contractual incompleteness; Cooperation; Repeated games; Reputation; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Theory and Decision, 2016, 80 (1), pp.125-158. ⟨10.1007/s11238-015-9493-0⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01300654

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-015-9493-0

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().