Competing for Influence in Networks Through Strategic Targeting

En compétition pour l'influence dans les réseaux grâce au ciblage stratégique

Margherita Comola (), Agnieszka Rusinowska and Marie Villeval ()
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Margherita Comola: RITM - Réseaux Innovation Territoires et Mondialisation - Université Paris-Saclay, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Marie Villeval: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - UJM EPE - Université Jean Monnet (EPSCPE) - EM - EMLyon Business School - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, IZA - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Institute of Labor Economics

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: We experimentally investigate targeting decisions in a setting where a human player competes for influence in a network against a computerized opponent with opposing views, whose targeting choice is revealed before the player acts. By varying network structure, opponent influence, and nodes opinion heterogeneity, we find that players typically adopt best-response strategies based on relative influence. However, they sometimes deviate – for example, by erroneously targeting central nodes or by avoiding the opponent's target. Targeting is also affected by affinity and opposition biases, the strength of which depends on the initial opinion distribution. Targeting the center, avoiding the competitor's target, or selecting nodes based on their initial opinions when these are not best responses generates significant efficiency losses.

Keywords: Network; Influence; Targeting; Competition; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-04-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-ipr and nep-net
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04706311v3
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2026, 158, pp.402-418. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2026.04.001⟩

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Related works:
Working Paper: Competing for Influence in Networks Through Strategic Targeting (2024)
Working Paper: Competing for Influence in Networks Through Strategic Targeting (2024)
Working Paper: Competing for Influence in Networks through Strategic Targeting (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-04706311

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.04.001

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