Learning to cooperate in the shadow of the law

Roberto Galbiati (), Emeric Henry and Nicolas Jacquemet ()
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Roberto Galbiati: ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: Formal enforcement punishing defectors can sustain cooperation by changing incentives. In this paper we introduce a second effect of enforcement: it can also affect the capacity to learn about the group's cooperativeness. Indeed, in contexts with strong enforcement, it is difficult to tell apart those who cooperate because of the threat of fines from those who are intrinsically cooperative types. Enforcement can then potentially have a negative dynamic impact on cooperation when it prevents learning. We provide theoretical and experimental evidence in support of this mechanism. Using a lab experiment with independent interactions and random rematching, we observe that, in early interactions, having faced an environment with fines in the past decreases current cooperation. We further show that this results from the interaction between enforcement and learning: the effect of having met cooperative partners has a stronger effect on current cooperation when this happened in an environment with no enforcement.

Keywords: Enforcement; social values; cooperation; learning; spillovers; repeated games; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-law
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04800439v1
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Published in Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2024, 10 (2), pp.165-198. ⟨10.1007/s40881-023-00159-x⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Learning to cooperate in the shadow of the law (2024)
Working Paper: Learning to cooperate in the shadow of the law (2024)
Working Paper: Learning to cooperate in the shadow of the law (2024)
Working Paper: Learning to cooperate in the shadow of the law (2024)
Working Paper: Learning to cooperate in the shadow of the law (2019)
Working Paper: Learning to cooperate in the shadow of the law (2019)
Working Paper: Learning to cooperate in the shadow of the law (2019)
Working Paper: Learning to cooperate in the shadow of the law (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-04800439

DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00159-x

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