Litigations in Labor Law: Intuition vs. Reflective Judgements ?

Bruno Deffains () and Samuel Ferey ()
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Bruno Deffains: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Samuel Ferey: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: A growing topic in Law and Economics is the organization of the judicial system. Models relating to the outcome of trials attempt to describe and explain the choice of the parties between litigation and settlement. The first analysis of this nature goes back to 1972 with the publication of Landes' article entitled ̈An Economic Analysis of the Courts (Landes, 1971). Further studies in this area have insisted on the strategic parties' behavior (Cooter and Rubinfeld, 1989).

Date: 2008
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Published in kritV (Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft), 2008, 90 (1-2), pp.175-184. ⟨10.5771/2193-7869-2007-1-2-175⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00278964

DOI: 10.5771/2193-7869-2007-1-2-175

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