On Taxation Pass-Through for a Monopoly Firm

Rabah Amir (), Isabelle Maret and Michael Troege
Additional contact information
Isabelle Maret: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Michael Troege: ESCP-EAP - ESCP-EAP - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Paris

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This paper investigates the pass-through of an excise tax imposed on a monopoly firm with constant marginal cost. The optimal price increases as tax increases for any demand function. Tax pass-through is globally under or in excess of 100% according as the direct demand function is log-concave or log-convex. The analysis relies on supermodular optimization and delivers conclusions based on minimal sufficient assumptions in a simple, broadly accessible and self-contained framework. Further results allow for mixed conditions that provide precise and local determination of pass-through. Several illustrative examples are given. Policy conclusions relating to the relative wisdom of taxing high versus low cost monopoly firms are drawn from the results.

Keywords: Firms; Marginal cost (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Published in Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, 2004, pp.155-172. ⟨10.2139/ssrn.967611⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: On Taxation Pass-Through for a Monopoly Firm (2004)
Working Paper: On taxation pass-through for a monopoly firm (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00279333

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.967611

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().