Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data

Jean Pinquet, Jaap Abbring () and Pierre-André Chiappori ()
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Pierre-André Chiappori: Department of Economics Columbia University - Columbia University [New York]

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Abstract: This paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of moral hazard. We first show that experience rating implies negative occurrence dependence under moral hazard: individual claim intensities decrease with the number of past claims. We then show that dynamic insurance data allow to distinguish this moral-hazard effect from dynamic selection on unobservables. We develop nonparametric tests and estimate a flexible parametric model. We find no evidence of moral hazard in French car insurance. Our analysis contributes to a recent literature based on static data that has problems distinguishing between moral hazard and selection and dealing with dynamic features of actual insurance contracts. Methodologically, this paper builds on and extends the literature on state dependence and heterogeneity in event-history data. (JEL: D82, G22, C41, C14)

Date: 2003-06-19
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Published in Journal of the European Economic Association, 2003, 1 (4), pp.767-820

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00397121

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