The organization of extended producer responsibility in waste policy with product differentiation

Pierre Fleckinger () and Matthieu Glachant

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Abstract: The paper analyzes the efficiency of extended producer responsibility (EPR) for waste management. We consider a vertically differentiated duopoly where endogenous market quality affects waste disposal costs. Each producer has to meet a take-back requirement that forces it to collect and treat the waste associated with its products. In line with reality, we assume that the producers either organize themselves individually or cooperate by setting up a producer responsibility organization (PRO). We study the various implementations of EPR. Central to the analysis is the trade-off between collusion through the PRO and market power in the waste industry.

Keywords: Extended producer responsibility; Waste policy; Product differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://minesparis-psl.hal.science/hal-00446819v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2010, 59 (1), pp.57-66. ⟨10.1016/j.jeem.2009.06.002⟩

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Journal Article: The organization of extended producer responsibility in waste policy with product differentiation (2010)
Working Paper: The organization of extended producer responsibility in waste policy with product differentiation (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00446819

DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2009.06.002

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