Un effet pervers de la responsabilité limitée

Sandrine Ollier ()
Additional contact information
Sandrine Ollier: CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE], GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Although legal restrictions limiting the workers' liability are made to increase their welfare, we show that they may lead to a perverse effect when more productive workers cross subsidize less productive workers. A generalized agency model is analyzed and used to show that exonerating a wealthy agent from liability for damages caused during the execution of the contract decreases the more productive workers' expected utility in the pooling equilibrium of the combined model.

Keywords: Effet pervers; responsabilité limitée (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Recherches Economiques de Louvain - Louvain economic review, 2006, 72 (3), http://www.cairn.info/revue-recherches-economiques-de-louvain-2006-3-p-265.htm. ⟨10.3917/rel.723.0265⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00447188

DOI: 10.3917/rel.723.0265

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().