Weak Approachability

Nicolas Vieille ()

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Abstract: In this paper, we study repeated games with vector payoffs. Following Blackwell [2], we define weak approachability and its dual property, weak excludability. We use results from differential games with fixed duration to prove that every set is either weakly approachable or weakly excludable.

Keywords: two-person; zero-sum games; approachability; excludability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1992-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 1992, Vol.17,n°4, pp.781-791. ⟨10.1287/moor.17.4.781⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00481891

DOI: 10.1287/moor.17.4.781

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