Les pratiques occultes des contrôleurs de gestion. Une étude ethnographique du "sale boulot"

Caroline Lambert () and Jérémy Morales ()
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Caroline Lambert: GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Jérémy Morales: DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Based on an ethnographic study, this paper analyzes hidden activities in management controllers' practice. We show that, while they wish to appear as business partners, they do not "sell" themselves to managers. On the contrary, they adopt avoidance strategies, intending to delegate or dissimulate the tasks they consider as impure, that is to say those that constitute their "dirty work". We argue that management accountants' feelings about their job shape control processes within the organisation.

Keywords: management controllers; ethnography; dirty work; contrôleurs de gestion; ethnographie; sale boulot (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-06
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Published in Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2009, 12 (2), pp.5-34

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00485614

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