Learning and Sophistication in Coordination Games

Kyle Hydman, Antoine Terracol and Jonathan Vaksmann ()
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Kyle Hydman: Department of Economics - SMU - Southern Methodist University [Dallas, TX, USA]
Jonathan Vaksmann: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper studies the role of strategic teaching in coordination games and whether changing the incentives of players to teach leads to more efficient coordination. We ran experiments where subjects played one of four coordination games in constant pairings, where the incentives to teach were varied along two dimensions--the short run cost of teaching and the long run benefit to teaching. We show which aspects of the game lead subjects to adopt long run teaching strategies, and show that subjects try to manipulate their opponent's actions to pull them out of a situation of coordination failure. We also show that extending a model of decision making by introducing a forward-looking component helps to track teachers' behaviour more accurately, and describes the way players behave in a more unified way across both teachers and learners.

Keywords: Learning; Teaching; Coordination; Experiment; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00607232v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Published in Experimental Economics, 2009, 12 (4), pp.450-472. ⟨10.1007/s10683-009-9223-y⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Learning and sophistication in coordination games (2009)
Working Paper: Learning and Sophistication in Coordination Games (2009)
Working Paper: Learning and Sophistication in Coordination Games (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00607232

DOI: 10.1007/s10683-009-9223-y

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