Threshold effects and international environmental agreements

Rodney Beard and Thilak Mallawaarachchi

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Abstract: In this paper we present a model of international environmental agreements in the presence of threshold effects. The model is in the tradition of models of international environmental agreements formulated as games in partition function form. Games in partition function form allow the incorporation of external effects between players. The model is applied to global climate change agreements. The agreement involves a contract between nations as to the level of abatement of greenhouse gas emissions and how thesebenefits are to be shared. Benefits to emissions abatement are subject to a threshold. Consequently, we model climate as a global threshold public good. This allows a mechanism to explore incentives and disincentives for signing agreements consequent to a critical number of other players committing to an agreement.

Date: 2011-04-13
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Published in Environmental Protection and Sustainability Forum (13-15 avril 2011; Université d'Exeter, Exeter, Royaume-Uni)., Apr 2011, Exeter, United Kingdom. p

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00616643

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