Making statements and approval voting

Itzhak Gilboa, Enriqueta Aragones and Andrew Weiss

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Abstract: We assume that people have a need to make statements, and construct a model in which this need is the sole determinant of voting behavior. In this model, an individual selects a ballot that makes as close a statement as possible to her ideal point, where abstaining from voting is a possible (null) statement. We show that in such a model, a political system that adopts approval voting may be expected to enjoy a significantly higher rate of participation in elections than a comparable system with plurality rule.

Keywords: Approval voting; Turnout (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Theory and Decision, 2011, 71 (4), pp.461-472. ⟨10.1007/s11238-010-9208-5⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Making statements and approval voting (2011)
Working Paper: Making Statements and Approval Voting (2005)
Working Paper: Making Statements and Approval Voting (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00745602

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-010-9208-5

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