Le rôle de l'information de gestion dans la relation dirigeants-actionnaires: le cas des sociétés de capital investissement

Florence Cavelius and Philippe Dessertine
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Florence Cavelius: CEROS - Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur les Organisations et la Stratégie - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre
Philippe Dessertine: CEROS - Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur les Organisations et la Stratégie - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre

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Abstract: The demand of management control information (MCI) and its use by Venture Capitalists (VC) are examined through a qualitative study. The VC, active investor concerned with investment return, may be interested by information traditionally reserved to the manager. The results show that the VC are implied to differing levels in obtaining MCI, which is expressed by distinct levels of involvement in the decisions. We enlighten a typology of the way of using this information by the VC. When the VC is active, the MCI is the vector of a true partnership between manager and investor, limited by legal difficulties.

Keywords: gouvernance d'entreprise; capital investissement; information de gestion; contrôle; coopération.; corporate governance; venture capital; management control information; control; cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-09-09
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00869175
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Published in Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2009, 2 (12), p65-95

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00869175

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