 Asymétries des marchés du travail et absorption des chocs en Union monétaire: les gouvernements doivent-ils se coaliser ?Post-Print from HAL Abstract: Given a monetary Union which is heterogeneous at the level of labour market flexibility, this paper investigates the effects in terms of macroeconomic stabilization of the different degrees of fiscal coordination between governments. We use a static Keynesian model within a closed monetary Union and we introduce an intermediate level of coordination between the national governments, which is the variable geometry coordination between economic clubs consisting of structurally close countries. The distinction between the wide Union's welfare and each country member's individual welfare proves that the effectiveness of a variable geometry fiscal coordination mainly depends on the type of the economic shocks affecting the Union members, the nature of the fiscal spillovers, and the extent of the Union's structural heterogeneity. While this type of game is effective in neutralizing the demand shocks, it doesn't manage to improve the national protection of all the country members against the supply shocks. Keywords: Economic policy; Macroeconomic Stabilization; Fiscal Coordination; Structural Heterogeneity; Economic Shocks; chocs économiques; hétérogénéité structurelle; coordination budgétaire; stabilisation macroéconomique; politiques économiques (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Panoeconomicus, 2008, 3, pp.325-352 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00954300 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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