Country size and strategic aspects of structural reforms in the EU

Eloi Laurent and Jacques Le Cacheux

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Abstract: The European Constitutional Treaty (ECT) was presented by its drafters as an explicit constitution for the European Union (EU 25). We argue that considered as the European economic constitution its provisions do not sufficiently allow for the possibility of cooperative collective decision (leading to convergence in welfare) in a more than ever numerous and heterogeneous EU. Our essential argument in this respect regards the implications of the structurally different economic performances and incentives of small and large countries under the European economic constitution. Finally, since the present European trade-off between "integrity" and "efficiency" appears sub-optimal, we present two original ways of achieving potentially better ones in the EU, through a "Great compromise" or "Economic constitution(s)," expressing a preference for the latter.

Date: 2006-06-12
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Published in NERO meeting, Jun 2006, OECD, Paris, France

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Working Paper: Country size and strategic aspects of structural reforms in the EU (2006)
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