Nash stability in fractional hedonic games

Vittorio Bilò (), Angelo Fanelli (), Michele Flammini (), Gianpiero Monaco () and Luca Moscardelli ()
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Vittorio Bilò: Dipartimento di Matematica Ennio De Giorgi - Università del Salento = University of Salento [Lecce]
Angelo Fanelli: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Michele Flammini: DISIM - Dipartimento di Ingegneria, Scienza dell'Informazione e Matematica - UNIVAQ - Università degli Studi dell'Aquila = University of L'Aquila = Université de L'Aquila, GSSI - Gran Sasso Science Institute
Gianpiero Monaco: DISIM - Dipartimento di Ingegneria, Scienza dell'Informazione e Matematica - UNIVAQ - Università degli Studi dell'Aquila = University of L'Aquila = Université de L'Aquila
Luca Moscardelli: Department of Economic Studies - University of Chieti-Pescara

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Abstract: Cluster formation games are games in which self-organized groups (or clusters) are created as a result of the strategic interactions of independent and selfish players. We consider fractional hedonic games, that is, cluster formation games in which the happiness of each player in a group is the average value she ascribes to its members. We adopt Nash stable outcomes, where no player can improve her utility by unilaterally changing her own group, as the target solution concept and study their existence, complexity and performance for games played on general and specific graph topologies.

Keywords: hedonic games; Nash stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Tie-Yan Liu, Qi Qi,Yinyu Ye. Web and Internet Economics, 8877, Springer International Publishing, pp.486-491, 2014, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 978-3-319-13128-3. ⟨10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_44⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01103984

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_44

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