Modeling criminality: the impact of emotions, norms and interaction structures

Roger Waldeck

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Abstract: Criminal behavior has been explained in the literature by rational or normative arguments. We propose a game theory framework of criminal behavior integrating both concepts. Specifically the modeling includes three factors, namely the gain from criminality, the adherence to a legal norm and social pressure from criminal peers. We show that criminality cannot be lower with increasing gain from criminality, lower adherence to the legal norm or higher social pressure from criminal peers. Finally, we observe by agent-based simulations that small local interaction structures lead to spatial segregation in criminality in the case where a polymorphic equilibrium is expected.

Keywords: Emotions; Norms; Network; Segregation; Agent-based modeling; Criminality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, 2016, 22 (2), pp.135 - 160. ⟨10.1007/s10588-015-9200-2⟩

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Journal Article: Modeling criminality: the impact of emotions, norms and interaction structures (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01321498

DOI: 10.1007/s10588-015-9200-2

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