 Service pooling strategy in service systems with impatient customersZied Jemai (),
J Peng and
O. Jouini ()
Post-Print from HAL Abstract: We consider a group of homogeneous and independent single server service providers with impatient customers, who quit the system without receiving service whenever theirs waiting times in the queue are longer than the patience times. The collaboration strategies for the capacity pooling situation are studied between the service providers. The undisputed advantage of the collaboration is the sharing of the instant idle resources, that improves resource utilisation in overall system. In order to analyze the profitable collaborative organization and the cost-sharing method, the cooperative game theory is considered. The total operation cost of the system is defined as the sum of a holding cost, a waiting cost and an abandonment cost. Under Markovian assumptions for inter-arrival, service and patience times, corresponding cost game with transferable utility is constructed with a fixed service capacity for each coalition. We prove that the grand coalition is the most profitable regime and that the game has a nonempty core. Moreover, we illustrate the coalition and individual profits of the pooling system. Keywords: service pooling; queueing systems; cooperative game theory; core allocations; customer abandonment (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in 11th International Conference on Modeling, Optimization and Simulation (MOSIM 2016), Aug 2016, Montréal, Canada There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01672408 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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