The Shapley Value and Apportionment among Multiple Tortfeasors

Valeur de Shapley et répartition des dommages civils en cas de multiples co-auteurs

Samuel Ferey ()
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Samuel Ferey: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Courts often face the difficult problem of establishing damage causation and apportioning compensation payments among multiple tortfeasors. However, legal scholars and practitioners are still looking for a systematic apportionment method. We analyse these issues from a cooperative game perspective. The problem is modelled as a transferable utility game to which standard solution concepts can be applied. Instead of reasoning on causation, we use the traditional solution of cooperative game theory to apportion the damages due by each tortfeasor. The Shapley value is particularly suited to this legal context, as its axioms are consistent with the fundamental principles of private law.

Keywords: Multiple tortfeasors; Causation; Shapley value; Damage; Sharing-rule; Causalité juridique; Répartition; Dommages civils; Valeur de Shapley (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Published in Economie et Prévision, 2015, 1-2 (202-203), pp.37-52. ⟨10.3917/ecop.202.0037⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01735888

DOI: 10.3917/ecop.202.0037

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