Rent-Sharing and Workers' Bargaining Power: An Empirical Cross-Country/ Cross-Industry Panel Analysis

Philippe Askenazy, Gilbert Cette and Paul Maarek

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Abstract: In this paper, we study how rents are shared between capital and labour, using industry†level panel data for 19 OECD countries from 1988 through to 2007. The first step is an explanation of the rent†creation process. We provide evidence of a significant impact of regulation on value†added prices at the industry level relative to the value†added price for the overall economy (rent). In the second step, we dissect the value†added sharing process. By running ordinary least†squares and instrumental variables estimations, we obtain results that confirm the Blanchardâ€"Giavazzi prediction: the impact of rents on the capital share depends on workers' bargaining power.

Keywords: output gap; prices; rents; unemployment; Capital share; market regulations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2018, 120 (2), pp.563 - 596. ⟨10.1111/sjoe.12228⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Rent‐Sharing and Workers' Bargaining Power: An Empirical Cross‐Country/ Cross‐Industry Panel Analysis (2018)
Working Paper: Rent building, rent sharing - A panel country-industry empirical analysis (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01840575

DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12228

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