Studying Unmanaged Earnings Distributions

L'étude des distributions de résultats non manipulés

Olivier Vidal ()
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Olivier Vidal: LIRSA - Laboratoire interdisciplinaire de recherche en sciences de l'action - CNAM - Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers [CNAM]

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Abstract: This article draws on an experiment to confirm the assumption underlying studies of earnings management to avoid reporting losses: distributions of unmanaged reported earnings should be smooth in appearance. Three simulations provide unmanaged earnings distributions which suggest that although firms have an incentive to manage earnings upwards to avoid reporting a loss, there is also an incentive to manage earnings downwards to avoid reporting earnings that are too high..

Keywords: experiment; accounting threshold; earnings distribution; Earnings management; Gestion du résultat; seuil comptable; expérimentation; distribution de résultats (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-05-30
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01902456
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Published in Accountability, Responsabilités et Comptabilités, May 2016, Poitier, France. pp.cd-rom

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01902456

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