How Variational Rational Agents Would Play Nash: A Generalized Proximal Alternating Linearized Method

Antoine Soubeyran, João Carlos O. Souza and Joao Xavier Cruz Neto

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Abstract: This chapter considers potential games, where agents play, each period, Nash worthwhile moves in alternation, such that their unilateral motivation to change rather than to stay, other players being supposed to stay, are high enough with respect to their resistance to change rather than to stay. This defines a generalized proximal alternating linearized algorithm, where resistance to change plays a major role, perturbation terms of alternating proximal algorithms being seen as the disutilities of net costs of moving.

Date: 2019-07
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Published in Akhtar A. Khan; Elisabeth Köbis; Christiane Tammer. Variational Analysis and Set Optimization, CRC Press, pp.44-71, 2019, 978-1-138-03726-7

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02097012

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