Gatekeeping and the Utilization of Physician Services in France: Evidence on the Médecin Traitant Reform

Magalie Dumontet, Thomas Buchmueller, Paul Dourgnon, Florence Jusot and Jérôme Wittwer
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Magalie Dumontet: IRDES - Institut de Recherche et Documentation en Economie de la Santé - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres, LIRAES - EA 4470 - Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de Recherche Appliquée en Economie de la Santé - UPD5 - Université Paris Descartes - Paris 5
Thomas Buchmueller: Inserm U1219, Population Health Research Center - Université de Bordeaux
Paul Dourgnon: IRDES - Institut de Recherche et Documentation en Economie de la Santé - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres
Jérôme Wittwer: Inserm (UMR 1219) - Université de Bordeaux

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Abstract: In 2005, France implemented a gatekeeping reform designed to improve care coordination and to reduce utilization of specialists' services. Under this policy, patients designate a médecin traitant, typically a general practitioner, who will be their first point of contact during an episode of care and who will provide referrals to specialists. A key element of the policy is that patients who self-refer to a specialist face higher cost sharing than if they received a referral from their médecin traitant. We consider the effect of this policy on the utilization of physician services. Our analysis of administrative claims data spanning the years 2000–2008 indicates that visits to specialists, which were increasing in the years prior to the implementation of the reform, fell after the policy was in place. Additional evidence from the administrative claims as well as survey data suggest that this decline arose from a reduction in self-referrals, which is consistent with the objectives of the policy. Visits fell significantly both for specialties targeted by the policy and specialties for which self-referrals are still allowed for certain treatments. This apparent spillover effect may suggest that, at least initially, patients did not understand the subtleties of the policy.

Keywords: Gatekeeping; Physician services utilization; Reform evaluation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published in Health Policy, 2017, 121 (6), ⟨10.1016/j.healthpol.2017.04.006⟩

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Journal Article: Gatekeeping and the utilization of physician services in France: Evidence on the Médecin traitant reform (2017)
Working Paper: Gatekeeping and the utilization of physician services in France: Evidence on the Médecin traitant reform (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02429628

DOI: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2017.04.006

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