Tariffs, market conduct and goverment commitment: policy implications for developing countries

Delia Baghdasaryan and Kresimir Zigic ()
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Delia Baghdasaryan: GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée = Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique

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Abstract: The authors analyse a simple ‘tariffs cum foreign competition' policy targeted at enhancing the competitive position of a domestic, developing country firm that competes with its developed country counterpart on the domestic market and that carries out an innovative (or imitative) effort. They evaluate this policy with respect to social welfare, type of oligopoly conduct, information requirement, time consistency and possibility of manipulative behaviour and conclude that the most robust policy setup is one in which the domestic government is unable to pre-commit to the level of its policy. They also study how the unit cost heterogeneity of the domestic firm affects trade protection.

Keywords: OPTIMAL TARIFF PROTECTION; GOVERNMENT NON COMMITMENT REGIME; INNOVATIVE IMITATIVE EFFORT; UNIT COST HETEREGONEITY; PAYS EN DEVELOPPEMENT; INDUSTRIE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Economics of Transition, 2010, 18 (1), pp.91-122. ⟨10.1111/j.1468-0351.2009.00372.x⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02654942

DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0351.2009.00372.x

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