Stop‐and‐Go Agricultural Policies

Politiques agricoles "Stop and Go"

Jean-Marc Bourgeon and Robert Chambers
Additional contact information
Robert Chambers: University of Maryland - Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: The optimal design of farm policy and public investment in agriculture in the presence of asymmetric information between the government and farmers is studied. It is shown that a mix of capped deficiency payments and voluntary paid land diversion can implement the optimal policy outcome. Optimal program design requires large farmers to farm all their land, and small farmers may or may not divert acreage. Decoupled policies are never optimal.

Keywords: Agricultural policy; Asymetric information; Decoupled payment; Public investment in research; Politique agricole; Asymétrie d'information; Paiement découplé; Investissement public; Recherche publique (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-02
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2000, 82 (1), pp.1-13. ⟨10.1111/0002-9092.00001⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Stop-and-Go Agricultural Policies (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02968356

DOI: 10.1111/0002-9092.00001

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().