Paying for Quality: Rewarding organizational efforts along the continuum of care
Rémunération à la qualité: Récompenser les efforts organisationnels le long du parcours du patient
Etienne Minvielle () and
John R. Kimberly
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Etienne Minvielle: CRG I3 - Centre de recherche en gestion i3 - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - Université Paris-Saclay - I3 - Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
John R. Kimberly: The Wharton School - University of Pennsylvania
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Abstract:
Pay-for-quality initiatives struggle to deliver positive results. At the same time, a current demand is to orient these incentives on the "value" (i.e. the outcomes obtained in relation to the costs). The thesis developed in this article is different: more than a financial incentive on outcomes, it is an incentive for organizational efforts which appears to have to be privileged in order to improve P4P approaches; the quality of the result must be reasoned at the individual level of each patient without requiring a financial incentive. To support this thesis, we propose to analyze the topics related to P4P from a managerial perspective.
Keywords: Paying for quality; quality of care; quality indicators; process measurments; organizational efforts; Rémunération à la qualité; qualité des soins; indicateurs qualité; indicateurs de processus; efforts organisationnels (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03058626v1
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Published in Journal de gestion et d'économie de la santé, inPress, 38 (4), pp.242-252
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03058626
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