Is the newcomer more aggressive when the incumbent is granted a Right-of-First-Refusal in a procurement auction? Experimental Evidence

Karine Brisset (), François Maréchal () and Francois Cochard ()
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Karine Brisset: CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]
François Maréchal: CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]
Francois Cochard: CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]

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Date: 2015-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in Theory and Decision, 2015, 78 (4), pp.639-665. ⟨10.1007/s11238-014-9438-z⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03282278

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-014-9438-z

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