Games with incomplete information: from repetition to cheap talk and persuasion

Françoise Forges ()
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Françoise Forges: CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This essay aims at showing that repeated games with incomplete information, which were conceived by Aumann and Maschler in the years 1960s, provide basic tools to study information transmission in static interactive decision problems, both when the agents monitoring information can lie ("cheap talk") and when they cannot ("persuasion").

Keywords: Incomplete Information; Repeated Game; Sender-Receiver Game; Bayesian Persuasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2020, 137

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03537868

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