Cartels et comportements des managers: analyse et implications pour les politiques publiques

Constance Monnier () and Emmanuel Combe
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Constance Monnier: PRISM Sorbonne - Pôle de recherche interdisciplinaire en sciences du management - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

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Abstract: In this article, we study the incentives of a manager implicated in a cartel. We apply a cost-benefit analysis, relating to the decision of starting and/or remaining in a cartel, at an individual level, including psychological and behavioral factors. Then we study how to dissuade him/her from colluding. Beyond administrative fines and detection by competition authorities, we analyse solutions inside the firm which contribute to better deter managers from engaging into these illegal prac - tices, and the role of public policy, in the broad sense of the term, in preventing these behaviors.

Keywords: executive compensation; Antitrust Policy; Corporate governance; Social responsability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-01-20
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Published in Revue Economique, 2016, Vol. 67 (HS1), pp.95-109. ⟨10.3917/reco.hs01.0095⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03692196

DOI: 10.3917/reco.hs01.0095

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