Determinants of outside director compensation in the major French companies
Les déterminants de la rémunération des administrateurs externes dans les sociétés françaises du SBF 120
Géraldine Broye and
Yves Moulin ()
Additional contact information
Géraldine Broye: EM Strasbourg - École de Management de Strasbourg = EM Strasbourg Business School
Yves Moulin: CEREFIGE - Centre Européen de Recherche en Economie Financière et Gestion des Entreprises - UL - Université de Lorraine
Post-Print from HAL
Abstract:
This study examines the determinants of the compensation arrangements for outside board members in a sample of 251 large French companies. Our results suggest that the ownership structure of the firm affects director compensation. Outside directors earn greater compensation when the ownership is more diffuse. These findings suggest that remuneration provides stronger incentives to monitor when the firm is not controlled by a blockholder. Furthermore, firms with more independent directors award higher remuneration for outside directors. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that independent directors negociate higher levels of compensation to motivate outside directors to act in the interest of shareholders.
Keywords: director compensation; corporate governance; board of directors; rémunération des administrateurs; conseils d’administration; gouvernance des entreprises (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-07-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Published in Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2012, 15-1/2, 25 p. ⟨10.4000/fcs.78⟩
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03750424
DOI: 10.4000/fcs.78
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().