Path Dependence in Merchant Institutions: The Case of French Public Timber Sales

Gérard Marty ()
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Gérard Marty: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The rules for selling timber originating from French public forests are set by a specific law, which in the course of history has granted a central role to the auction system. For centuries, and until recently, this sales mechanism was the only one that ensured the distribution of timber. However, due to the lack of competitiveness in the French timber industry the auction — as an institution — (North, 1994, p. 360) has been blamed in the last few decades in several reports as being responsible for the difficulties suffered by timber professionals. Even so, the auction still remains the favorite mechanism for selling public timber. This situation leads us to question the reasons for the persistence of this institution over a long period of time.

Keywords: Comparative International Development; Path Dependence; Auction Mechanism; Selling Practice; Supply Contract (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Published in Schreyögg, G; Sydow, J. The Hidden Dynamics of Path Dependence, Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp.148-160, 2010, 978-1-349-30630-5. ⟨10.1057/9780230274075_9⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03930430

DOI: 10.1057/9780230274075_9

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