Costly Concessions: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility

Alfred Galichon (), Scott Kominers and Simon Weber
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Alfred Galichon: NYU - NYU System, ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Simon Weber: University of York [York, UK]

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Abstract: We introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable utility and unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. Our framework allows us to characterize matching equilibrium in a flexible way that includes as special cases fully and nontransferable utility models, collective models, and settings with taxes on transfers. We allow for the introduction of a general class of additive unobserved heterogeneity on agents' preferences. We show existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium under minimal assumptions. We provide two algorithms to compute the equilibrium in our model. We then show that the associated log likelihood has a simple expression and compute its derivatives. An empirical illustration is provided in the appendix.

Date: 2019-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Journal of Political Economy, 2019, 127 (6), pp.2875-2925. ⟨10.1086/702020⟩

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Related works:
Working Paper: Costly Concessions: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility (2019)
Working Paper: Costly Concessions: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03948104

DOI: 10.1086/702020

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