Market discipline in international banking regulation: Keeping the playing field level

Adrian Pop ()
Additional contact information
Adrian Pop: Nantes Univ - IAE Nantes - Nantes Université - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises - Nantes - Nantes Université - pôle Sociétés - Nantes Univ - Nantes Université

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: The focus of this article is the debt market as a powerful disciplinarian source for large and complex banking organizations around the world. We empirically study the interactions between reinforcing banks' market discipline and preserving a level playing field in international banking. Our approach consists of conducting cross-country comparisons of the secondary market prices sensitivity to market measures of bank risk (traditional & financial strength ratings). The results are generally consistent with the market discipline paradigm. However, much progress still needs to be made (especially in Japan and certain European countries) in order to make the level playing field principle compatible with the reinforcement of market discipline on an international level.

Keywords: International banking regulation; Basel II; Market discipline; Subordinated debt; Credit spreads (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-10
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Journal of Financial Stability, 2006, 2 (3), pp.286-310. ⟨10.1016/j.jfs.2006.07.002⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04212791

DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2006.07.002

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().