Entry in first-price auctions with signaling

Olivier Bos and Tom Truyts
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Tom Truyts: CEREC - Centre de recherche en économie - Université Saint-Louis - Bruxelles

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Abstract: We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the participation decisions and the auction outcome are used by an outside observer to infer the bidders' types. We show that this auction has a unique fully separating equilibrium bidding function. When the bidders' sensibility for the signaling concern is sufficiently strong, the expected revenue maximizing entry fee is the maximal fee that guarantees full participation. The larger is the bidder's sensibility, the higher is the optimal participation.

Keywords: First-price auction; Entry; Monotonic signaling; Social status (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-12-02
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Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 2022, 52 (2), pp.423-450. ⟨10.1007/s00182-022-00823-2⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Entry in first-price auctions with signaling (2023)
Working Paper: Entry in First-Price Auctions with Signaling (2022)
Working Paper: Entry in first-price auctions with signaling (2022)
Working Paper: Entry in First-price Auctions with Signaling (2016)
Working Paper: Entry in first-price auctions with signaling (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04469151

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00823-2

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