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Lionel Thomas ()
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Lionel Thomas: CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]

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Abstract: This paper studies multi-period public procurement when the acquisition of a single good over several periods is fixed once for all. The optimal mechanism is derived over two periods with temporal cost correlation. The most efficient firm delivers the good and gets informational rent at each period. But it must pay a fee in the first in order to keep the market in the second. Moreover, we present two implementation mechanisms which generalize the price equivalence theorem established for first and second price sealed-bid auctions.

Date: 2005
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Published in Revue d'économie politique, 2005, 115 (1), pp.103-127

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04526542

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