Pay all subjects or pay only some? An experiment on decision-making under risk and ambiguity

Ilke Aydogan, Loïc Berger () and Vincent Théroude
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Ilke Aydogan: LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221 - UA - Université d'Artois - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221 - UA - Université d'Artois - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Loïc Berger: LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221 - UA - Université d'Artois - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221 - UA - Université d'Artois - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Vincent Théroude: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: We investigate the validity of a double random incentive system where only a subset of subjects is paid for one of their choices. By focusing on individual decision-making under risk and ambiguity, we show that using either a standard random incentive system, where all subjects are paid, or a double random system, where only 10% of subjects are paid, yields similar preference elicitation results. These findings suggest that adopting a double random incentive system could significantly reduce experimental costs and logistic efforts, thereby facilitating the exploration of individual decision-making in larger-scale and higher-stakes experiments.

Keywords: Experimental methodology; Payment methods; Incentives; Ambiguity elicitation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-upt
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04818422v1
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Published in Journal of Economic Psychology, 2024, 104, pp.102757. ⟨10.1016/j.joep.2024.102757⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04818422

DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2024.102757

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