Common-pool resource management and risk misperceptions

Gestion des ressources communes et perception erronée des risques

Can Askan Mavi () and Nicolas Querou
Additional contact information
Can Askan Mavi: UMR PSAE - Paris-Saclay Applied Economics - AgroParisTech - Université Paris-Saclay - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: We study a dynamic model of common-pool resource management in which agents have different (mis)perceptions about the probability of a regime shift. We show that differences in risk misperceptions and the pre-and post-shift resource quality levels have a first-order effect on the noncooperative policy. Regarding the efficiency benchmarks, these differences have no effect on the cooperative solution under a paternalistic social planner. However, they do have a first-order effect on the populist cooperative solution, even when agents are on average unbiased. A tragedy of the commons problem arises at the aggregate population level, but not at all sub-population levels. From the point of view of policy instruments, a uniform quota policy would be optimal, while either a uniform or a differentiated tax policy would not be.Finally, policies aimed at correcting misperceptions have an ambiguous effect on welfare as it depends on certain characteristics (resource quality levels, population structure).

Keywords: Dynamic games; Conservation; Renewable resources; Environmental risk; Risk misperceptions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-12-06
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-04826269v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Annals of Economics and Statistics, inPress

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-04826269v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Common-pool Resource Management and Risk Misperceptions (2024)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04826269

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().