Common-pool resource management and risk misperceptions

Gestion des ressources communes et perception erronée des risques

Can Askan Mavi () and Nicolas Querou
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Can Askan Mavi: UMR PSAE - Paris-Saclay Applied Economics - AgroParisTech - Université Paris-Saclay - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: We study a dynamic model of common-pool resource management in which agents have different (mis)perceptions about the probability of a regime shift. We show that differences in risk misperceptions and the pre-and post-shift resource quality levels have a first-order effect on the noncooperative policy. Regarding the efficiency benchmarks, these differences have no effect on the cooperative solution under a paternalistic social planner. However, they do have a first-order effect on the populist cooperative solution, even when agents are on average unbiased. A tragedy of the commons problem arises at the aggregate population level, but not at all sub-population levels. From the point of view of policy instruments, a uniform quota policy would be optimal, while either a uniform or a differentiated tax policy would not be.Finally, policies aimed at correcting misperceptions have an ambiguous effect on welfare as it depends on certain characteristics (resource quality levels, population structure).

Keywords: Risk misperceptions; Environmental risk; Renewable resources; Dynamic games; Conservation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-12-06
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-04826269v1
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Published in Annals of Economics and Statistics, inPress

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