Individual versus group-level agglomeration bonuses to conserve biodiversity *

François Bareille () and Raphaël Soubeyran ()
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François Bareille: UMR PSAE - Paris-Saclay Applied Economics - AgroParisTech - Université Paris-Saclay - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Raphaël Soubeyran: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier

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Abstract: Agglomeration bonuses (ABs) are payments conditional on the contiguity of landowners' conservation areas. We study whether differentiating the bonuses between internal (withinlandholding) and external (between-landholdings) boundaries can improve biodiversity conservation. Using an ecological-economic model and game theory, our simulations on realistic landscapes consisting of several multi-plot landholdings reveal that such differentiation is key in determining AB cost-effectiveness. Undifferentiated ABs (where internal equal external bonuses) are the most cost-effective schemes when regulators' budgets are low. Yet, when budgets increase, AB cost-effectiveness improves by increasingly prioritizing internal over external bonuses, until a budget threshold beyond which only internal bonuses remain. The complexity of compensation between plots belonging to different landowners largely explains these patterns. Given this complexity, the most cost-effective schemes are characterized by little or no cooperation between landowners. Regarding policy, we conclude that differentiated ABs are cost-effective schemes that should be part of the regulators' toolbox.

Keywords: Agglomeration Bonus; Biodiversity; Coalitions; Collective schemes; Cooperative management; Group incentives; Group-level schemes; Habitat conservation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-05101418v1
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Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, In press

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05101418

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