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The Game of the Name: A Fundamental Analysis of the Institution of Names

Laurent Gauthier ()
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Laurent Gauthier: CAC-IXXI, Complex Systems Institute, ESPRI - Espace, Pratiques sociales et Images dans les mondes Grec et Romain - ArScAn - Archéologies et Sciences de l'Antiquité - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - UP8 - Université Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - MCC - Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The fact that we all have names makes naming an ubiquitous institution. We develop a game-theoretic model to explain the existence of single names (anthroponyms) and how they may be exchanged as a way to promote cooperation. In social interactions, names provide partial identification information that can help reduce the likelihood of cheating, which would be higher with alternative information structures. We then propose a definition of honor based on the probability of being cheated, and derive general patterns for optimal naming that may maximize honor.

Keywords: Game theory; Onomastics; Conformity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-08-29
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Published in Rationality and Society, 2025, ⟨10.1177/10434631251366145⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05161221

DOI: 10.1177/10434631251366145

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