Pricing Behaviors on Networks: Some General Results for Two-way Networks 1

Antoine Soubeyran and Hubert Stahn
Additional contact information
Antoine Soubeyran: GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Hubert Stahn: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: In this paper, we study monopolistic pricing behaviors within a two-way network. In this symbiotic production system, independent decision centers carry out an activity which concurs to the production of different system goods. The players are assumed to know the whole network. Due to this rationality, they try to capture a share of the profit of the firms who sell the system goods to the consumers. These double marginalization behaviors are studied within very general networks. Conditions with ensure existence and uniqueness are discussed. We even provided a complete characterization of an equilibrium. Potential applications are also discussed

Keywords: Non-cooperative games; Two-way networks; Monopolistic behaviors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05221032v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in Journal of Global Optimization, 2001, 20 (3-4), pp.347-373. ⟨10.1023/A:1017966023424⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-05221032v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05221032

DOI: 10.1023/A:1017966023424

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().