Employee director compensation as a revealer of the ambiguities of their role
La rémunération des administrateurs salariés, révélatrice des ambiguïtés de leur rôle
Riyad Manseri
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Riyad Manseri: LADYSS - Laboratoire Dynamiques Sociales et Recomposition des Espaces - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - UP8 - Université Paris 8 - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UPCité - Université Paris Cité
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Abstract:
The analysis of the compensation that employee directors may receive for their directorship reveals the underlying stakes at the core of their mandate. On one hand, it raises questions about the relationships employee directors maintain with employees and other employee representatives. On the other hand, it raises questions about their relationships with other directors, by whom they wish to be recognised as legitimate interlocutors. Ultimately, employee directors are torn between two conceptions of their role, a tension illustrated by the diverse meanings they ascribe to their compensation.
Keywords: codetermination; employee directors; director compensation; corporate governance; codétermination; administrateurs salariés; rémunération des administrateurs; gouvernance d’entreprise (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05296510v1
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Published in Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2024, NS-16, ⟨10.4000/12nik⟩
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05296510
DOI: 10.4000/12nik
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