Lead Investor Nominee in Equity Crowdfunding

J. Coakley, D. Cumming, A. Lazos () and S. Vismara
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A. Lazos: Audencia Business School

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Abstract: The lead investor nominee structure in equity crowdfunding (ECF) integrates the strengths of the pure ECF and angel ECF models. By committing their own capital, lead investors address two key challenges: mitigating adverse selection through thorough due diligence and reducing moral hazard by monitoring the firm post-campaign to secure returns. The digital nominee governance structure ensures equal ownership and voting rights for all investors, resolving potential conflicts between angels, accredited investors and the crowd. This model fosters collaboration between professional investors and the crowd, leveraging their respective strengths. Analysis of extensive UK data shows that nominee ECF campaigns outperform direct ownership campaigns in both the short and long term. These findings provide valuable governance insights for platform managers and policymakers.

Keywords: Crowdfunding; Angel; Lead investor; Nominee; Governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-10
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Published in British Journal of Management, 2025, ⟨10.1111/1467-8551.12918⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05296848

DOI: 10.1111/1467-8551.12918

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