 The IL&FS Fiasco and the Lessons LearntAnant Kothari and
Anindita Ghosh
Post-Print from HAL Abstract: The analysis of this paper revolves around the Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services (IL&FS), established in 1987 as an "RBI-registered Core Investment Company". IL&FS falls under the category of ‘shadow bank' - this term was first advocated by Paul McCulley at the Annual Meeting of FED in 2007. It is notable that in the absence of regulatory oversight, such a system acts as a consortium of intermediaries to facilitate the creation of credit across the global financial system. The entity under review operates in multifaceted sectors like real estate, energy, transportation, and financial services. Its operations are conducted through directly as well as indirectly controlled subsidiaries, associates, and joint venture entities. Though financial scandals and frauds are in no way new to India, it is disheartening to note a considerable rise of such instances in recent times. The IL&FS crisis came in the wake of the Punjab National Bank scam, estimated at a value of Rs. 13,600 crores. If the Satyam fraud can be considered as the Indian Enron, then the IL&FS may be dubbed as the becoming of India's own ‘Lehman Brothers'. Date: 2020-07-31 Published in Asian Journal of Economics, Finance and Management , 2020, 2 (1), pp.140-153 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05298621 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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