Desirability and social ranking

Michele Aleandri, Felix Fritz and Stefano Moretti ()
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Michele Aleandri: LUISS - Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli [Roma]
Felix Fritz: LAMSADE - Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Stefano Moretti: LAMSADE - Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We present an axiomatic study of various solutions to the social ranking problem, where a solution links any ranking of coalitions of players to a binary relation between individual players. We focus on solutions that align with the desirability relation, asserting that player i is more desirable than player j if any coalition including i but not j ranks higher than the corresponding coalition formed by replacing i with j. Unlike previous characterizations, our study highlights the central role of the desirability property as a foundational axiom in the characterization of five solutions from the related literature: Ceteris Paribus majority, lexicographic excellence and its dual, L (1) solution and its dual. Our main results reveal additional similarities among these five solutions and emphasize the essential features that should be considered when selecting the most appropriate solution for a given scenario. A practical application involving a bicameral legislature is also presented.

Keywords: social ranking problem; axiomatic approach; desirability; power index; coalitional games; coalitional ranking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-04-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05365555v1
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Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2025, 65 (3), pp.721-763. ⟨10.1007/s00355-025-01590-1⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05365555

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-025-01590-1

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